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Abstract 
We extend the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model of imperfect competition to allow for 
multiproduct firms. We fully endogenise market structure by determining both the number 
of varieties per firm and the number of firms in the industry.  A crucial feature of the model 
is that firms internalise the effects of both intra- and inter-firm competition in making their 
product range and pricing decisions.  The model is used to explore the proposition that 
shakeout in some industries may result from a shift from a fragmented market structure 
with many single-product firms to a concentrated equilibrium with a few large firms each 
offering many products.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Markets for many manufactured goods are in differentiated products rather than in 
homogeneous commodities, and firms producing in these industries typically offer not one 
but a range of varieties of the same product to cater to the diversity of consumer tastes. Yet, 
product differentiation and multiproduct firms have mainly been considered separately in 
theoretical studies. Most of the work on product differentiation has dealt with single 
product firms while research on multiproduct firms has largely followed Baumol et al. 
(1982) in focusing on the role of cost factors in generating outcomes in which firms 
produce several products. As a result, the literature on multiproduct firms is particularly 
poorly developed in relation to the role of demand factors in the determination of 
equilibrium in differentiated goods markets.  
In this paper, we develop a model that extends the standard Dixit-Stiglitz 
framework of product differentiation (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) to allow for multiproduct 
firms. On the demand side, we represent preferences for the differentiated product by a 
nested CES utility function, with the degree of substitutability between the varieties 
produced by any one firm being higher than that between varieties produced by different 
firms. On the supply side, we allow for both economies of scope and scale through the 
introduction of both firm-level and variety-level fixed costs. Firms choose the size of their 
product range and compete in price, with the number of firms determined by the free entry 
equilibrium. 
At a theoretical level, the main implication of the extension of the standard Dixit-
Stiglitz framework to multiproduct firms is to break the identity between the mass of 
varieties and the mass of firms. Two main (partially related) issues then arise. The first 
concerns the determination of market structure and the second concerns the optimal 
behaviour of firms. Both of these issues are dealt with in this paper. 
Market structures with multiproduct firms may range from fragmented equilibria 
(in which a large number of firms offer either one or a small range of products) to 
concentrated equilibria (in which either one or a small number of firms each offer many 
products). Shaked and Sutton (1990) argue that the key issue that the literature on 
multiproduct firms in differentiated markets ought to address is what basic features of 
consumer preferences lead to the appearance of the various possible equilibria. Yet, with 
the notable exceptions of Anderson and de Palma (1992), and Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) 
this literature has not fully endogenised market structure by considering the joint 
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determination of the equilibrium numbers of firms, total product varieties and varieties per 
firm on offer. Some studies focus on the choice of the size of product range by individual 
firms in differentiated markets while taking the number of firms as given (see, for example, 
Schmalansee, 1978, Raubitschek, 1987, and Champsaur and Rochet, 1989)1. Other work 
examines the emergence of multiproduct firms in the context of inter-related markets while 
holding the total number of distinguishable product varieties fixed (see, for instance, 
Wolinsky, 1986, Shaked and Sutton, 1990, and Hanly and Cheung, 1998). Finally, there are 
a number of papers which deal with product line selection by multiproduct firms while 
treating both the number of firms and the number of products per firm as exogenous (see, 
especially, Brander and Eaton, 1984). Clearly, any analysis which takes either the number 
of firms, total product varieties or varieties per firm as fixed can at best provide only a 
partial explanation of the emergence of the equilibrium market structure. A first crucial 
feature of our analysis is that it endogenously determines both the equilibrium number of 
firms and varieties.  
With respect to the optimal behaviour of firms, two aspects deserve attention. The 
first is that of intra-firm competition (known as ‘cannibalisation’): when a firm reduces its 
price on one of its varieties this will decrease demand for all the other substitute varieties 
the firm produces. Each firm therefore needs to internalise competition within its product 
line. Second, there is an issue of inter-firm competition: even assuming that the number of 
firms in the market is large, the multidimensionality of the firm’s product range implies 
that each firm is likely to be a ‘large actor’. This clearly casts doubt on the plausibility of 
the atomistic assumption of the standard monopolistic competition model whereby firms 
behave in a non-strategic manner. A second crucial feature of our model is to allow both 
for (i) the full internalisation of the cannibalisation effect by firms, and (ii) the strategic 
interaction between firms which therefore behave like oligopolists and not as monopolistic 
competitors as in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz framework (Beath and Katsoulacos, 1991). To 
our knowledge, this is the first paper to do so within a CES framework of multiproduct firm 
competition. Raubitschek (1987), who specifies a single-level CES utility function on the 
assumption that all products compete as equal substitutes, makes no allowance for price co-
ordination within firms or strategic interaction between firms. Anderson and de Palma 
(1992) and Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) allow for both intra-firm decision coordination and 
for inter-firm competition, but within a nested multinomial logit and a quadratic utility 
model respectively.  
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Our model is similar in spirit to the nested multinomial logit model of Anderson 
and de Palma (1992) but the adoption of the representative consumer framework on the 
demand side facilitates the interpretation of the analytical results. In particular, paralleling 
Shaked and Sutton (1990), we identify a competition effect, which is given by the Lerner 
index of market power, and an expansion effect, which measures the responsiveness of the 
variable profits of a firm to a change in the size of its product range, as determinants of the 
market equilibria. The resultant interpretation of the equilibrium outcomes is particularly 
simple and intuitive. Moreover, the competition and expansion effects have the further 
appeal that they are potentially observable market characteristics that could be employed to 
generate testable predictions about the relationship between market size and market 
structure. 
The development of a multiproduct firm version of the standard representative 
consumer framework of product differentiation so as to capture an important feature of real 
world industries, is particularly relevant given the widespread popularity of the Dixit-
Stiglitz model in many areas of economics. Thus, the model has a number of potentially 
interesting applications both within and outside industrial organisation, in areas such as 
trade theory and macroeconomics. We use it here to explore the proposition that the 
shakeout phenomenon, in which the number of firms in an industry approaching maturity 
falls despite continuing growth in the market, may result in some cases from a change in 
the scope as well as the scale of firms over the course of the product life cycle.  
This analysis complements the standard explanation of shakeout, which describes it 
as the outcome of a period of scale-intensive process innovations initiated by the 
emergence of a dominant design (Utterback and Suarez, 1993), by suggesting a richer 
menu of possible mechanisms. On the supply side, process innovations may generate 
economies of scope, as well as of scale, promoting the emergence of large, multiproduct 
firms (Chandler, 1990). On the demand side, product standardisation would of itself be 
expected to compress price-cost margins leading to a more competitive market capable of 
supporting fewer firms, and may also favour multiproduct firms to the extent that changes 
in the constellation of product varieties on offer increase the relative contribution of an 
additional variety to the total variable profits of a firm. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the following section we set up our 
model of imperfect competition with multiproduct firms and in section 3 we derive the 
market outcome in the symmetric, free entry equilibrium. In Section 4 we then use the 
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model to consider the theoretical possibility that the emergence of multiproduct firms is a 
contributory factor in the shakeout phenomenon. Specifically, we conjecture that shakeout 
may in part reflect a shift in industry structure from a larger number of firms supplying 
only one or a few products, to a smaller number of firms each offering many products. 
Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. THE MODEL 
We consider an imperfectly competitive industry with multiproduct firms producing a 
horizontally differentiated good to cater to the diversity of consumer tastes. The varieties of 
the good are grouped into nests with the degree of substitutability between varieties within 
nests being higher than that between nests. The analysis is developed within a partial 
equilibrium framework. 
 
2.1. Consumers 
On the demand side of the model, we adopt the representative consumer framework as in 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)2. The behaviour of the representative consumer may be regarded 
as the outcome of a three-stage utility maximisation procedure3. In the first stage, the 
consumer optimally allocates expenditure between the differentiated good and a single 
outside good. In the second and third stage consumption decisions are made respectively 
over nests and over the varieties within each nest. In both of these stages, preferences – 
which reward product diversity – are described by CES utility functions. This is in essence 
a nested version of the CES model4.  In common with the nested logit model (Ben-Akiva, 
1973; Anderson and de Palma, 1992; Anderson et al., 1992), it allows for the possibility of 
localised competition since the elasticity of substitution between varieties belonging to the 
same nest may differ from that between nests5.  The nested CES therefore provides a richer 
characterisation of the nature of competition than the standard Dixit-Stiglitz formulation. 
We assume for the sake of simplicity that preferences in the first stage are described 
by a Cobb-Douglas utility function U , 0 <  < 1, where z is the quantity of an 
outside composite good used as the numeraire and x is the aggregate or industry quantity 
index of the differentiated good (to be defined below). The total expenditure on the 
differentiated good y = (1-)I is simply given in this first stage as a constant share of the 
exogenously determined consumer income I. 
 

1xz
 4 
 
 
 
 
The second stage utility function is given by the industry-level quantity index of the 
differentiated good and is defined as follows: 
(1) 
1
0
1







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 




dixx
n
i
i   
where  >1 is the elasticity of substitution between nests and n is the mass of available 
nests 6; xi, the quantity index of the varieties in a typical nest i , corresponds to the 
third stage sub-utility function and is given by: 
 n,0 
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where  >1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties within a nest and xik is 
consumption of a typical variety k  from nest i. We further make the natural 
assumption that  >: that is, substitutability between varieties is higher within nests than 
between nests. When  =, all varieties are equally substitutable and nests cannot therefore 
be distinguished: it can easily be verified that (1)-(2) reduces to a single-stage CES 
function with a total mass of varieties v=nm.  
 im,0 
The price indexes dual to the utility functions in (1) and (2) are respectively given 
by: 
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where p is the industry price index, pi is the price index of the varieties within the typical 
nest i, and  is the price of a typical variety k in nest i. As a reflection of love of variety, 
the price indexes in (3) and (4) are decreasing in n and  respectively. 
ikp
im
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 Thus, in the second stage of utility maximisation, the representative consumer 
maximises (1) subject to the budget constraint y  to obtain the following 
system of demand functions: 
dixppx
n
ii
0i
=  = 
(5)  








p
p
p
yx ii   
which give the ‘aggregate’ demand for each nest.  
 In the third stage, the representative consumer will maximise the sub-utility 
function in (2) subject to the budget constraint . The resulting demand 
function for each variety k in nest i will be given by 
dkxpxp
im
k
ikikii 


0
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Thus, the demand for the individual variety will depend negatively on its price and 
positively on both the nest-level and industry-level price indexes.  
 
2.2.  Producers 
In the literature, two main cases of multiproduct firms with horizontal product 
differentiation have been considered (see Brander and Eaton, 1984; Anderson and de Palma, 
1992). In the first, each nest  is taken to correspond to a firm, with the typical firm i 
producing a mass m
 ni ,0 

i of varieties of the good. This is normally referred to as the ‘market 
segmentation’ case. In the alternative case, referred to as ‘market interlacing’, each nest 
 is assumed to consist of varieties produced by different firms with the typical nest 
i occupied by a mass m
 ni ,0
i of firms.  
Clearly, the choice between these two alternative industry configurations will be 
dictated by the definition and characteristics of the product market under consideration7. In 
this paper we formally consider only market segmentation8 in which the products of a firm 
are perceived by consumers to be closer substitutes to each other than to those of other 
firms. Market segmentation is characteristic of those industries in which the brand name or 
'label' is the primary locus of differentiation with other specific product attributes being of 
secondary importance9. For example, Levi Strauss & Co. and other leading suppliers of 
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jeans are able to command significant price premia across their entire ranges in spite of 
independent test evidence that the quality of their products is not superior to that of other 
manufacturers (Consumers' Association, 1993; Asda, 2002). Brander and Eaton (1984) cite 
the restaurant trade as another plausible example of a segmented market in that customers 
will often first choose which restaurant to patronise and only then select specific items from 
the menu. In general, firms can seek to create and sustain segmented market structures by 
pursuing differentiation strategies based on advertising, brand image, product design, 
styling, distribution channels, delivery terms, credit facilities, service arrangements and 
other dimensions of the total offering to customers (see Levitt, 1980).  
We therefore specify that each nest corresponds to a firm. All the varieties in a nest 
are produced by the same firm and there is a one-to-one correspondence between the mass 
of nests and the mass of firms in the industry.  Firms employ a globally increasing returns 
to scale and scope technology. In addition to a fixed production cost per variety, which is 
standard in the monopolistic competition literature, we assume the existence of a firm-level 
fixed cost, which must be paid regardless of the size of the firm’s product range. 
Technology is assumed to be identical across firms. The total cost function of a typical firm 
i is therefore given by 
(7)   








 

im
k
ikii dkxmC
0

where  is the firm-level fixed cost,  is the fixed cost per variety and  is the firm’s 
marginal cost. Given the assumed symmetry, ,  and  are the same for all firms.  
The firm-level fixed cost  implies that the cost structures of the different varieties 
produced by a firm are not independent:  can be thought of as being related to firm-
specific activities, as for example marketing, distribution and management services. The 
existence of  generates economies of scope and thereby provides an incentive for the firm 
to produce a mass of varieties of the good. Clearly, the size of each firm’s product range 
will be limited by the existence of the variety-level fixed cost  – which will typically 
include the cost of launching a new variety – and implies that there are scale economies at 
the variety level.  
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3. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
Following Chamberlin (1933), we think of the long-run equilibrium as being determined by 
free-entry. In the short-run, market structure can be characterised by a given mass of firms 
n.  Firms’ decisions are modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage firms choose the 
size of their product range (i.e. the mass of varieties to produce) and in the second stage 
they compete in price. The model is solved by backward induction using the sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibrium concept to determine the symmetric market solution. The 
symmetric long-run equilibrium mass of firms is determined by the zero-profit condition.  
 
3.1.  Pricing behaviour and product range choice 
Firms choose the mass of varieties to produce and the price of each variety in a two-stage 
game. In the second stage of the game, the mass of firms and the mass of varieties 
produced by each firm are predetermined and firms compete in price. As in Anderson and 
de Palma (1992), we assume that each firm co-ordinates its pricing decisions across all the 
varieties that it produces so as to maximise overall profits. In other words, each firm will 
internalise the fact that when reducing the price of one of the varieties that it produces, 
demand for all its other varieties will fall (the cannibalisation effect). We shall further 
assume that, since firms may produce a non-negligible set of varieties, they will take into 
account the effects of their pricing decisions on the industry’s price index, while taking the 
prices of all other firms as given. A Nash equilibrium in prices will therefore emerge, with 
each firm choosing a pricing rule for each variety within its nest. Given the demand 
functions in (5), the profit function of a typical firm i will be: 
(8) .   








 


i
m
k
ikikii mdkpppyp
i
0
1 )(
Differentiating (8) with respect to pij yields the set of first order conditions: 
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 . 
Each first-order condition is an implicit function of the profit maximising price for one 
variety given the prices of all other varieties (both those produced by the firm and those 
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produced by its competitors). Given symmetric preferences and the assumed cost structure, 
equation (9) implies that a typical firm i will charge the same price for all the varieties 
within its nest, i.e.  iikij mkjpp ,0,  
10. Thus, for a typical variety k produced by 
firm i, (9) may be re-written as: 
(10)  0)1()(1
1
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where the first term gives the standard ‘Chamberlinian’ first-order condition and the second 
term reflects the behavioural assumptions that the firm internalises the effects of 
competition both within its product line and between firms within the industry11.  From 
equation (10) we obtain  
(11)   
 
;
1
1
1)1(
)1(
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ik Lpp
ppp
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where  iikiki sppL )1(/1)(    and .  is the Lerner index of 
market power, which determines the magnitude of the mark-up over marginal cost, and s  
is the market share of firm i defined as the proportion of the total expenditure on the 
differentiated good y that it holds.  Thus,  – by determining the gap between the 
imperfectly competitive prices and those characterising a competitive outcome – can be 
seen as providing a measure of what Shaked and Sutton (1990) call the ‘competition’ 
effect.  The market power of the firm is lower the smaller is the market share of an 
individual firm.  
   1/ pps ii iL
i
iL
In the first stage of the game, anticipating the subsequent price competition, firms 
decide on the mass of varieties they will produce in their respective nests taking as given 
the mass of competitors determined by the free-entry equilibrium. We assume that firms 
play a Nash game with each other, so that when a typical firm i chooses its product range 
 it takes as given the product ranges of all other firms.  im
Given equation (11), the definition of the firm-level price index in (4) and the result 
that a typical firm i will choose to charge the same price for all of its varieties, the profit 
function in (8) can be re-written as: 
(12)   nimsyL iiii ,0;  
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since ijii pmp  1
1
, given that pij=pik k  [0, mi].  Differentiation of (12) with respect to 
mi yields the first order condition 0
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. In the closed 
loop solution, the firm is assumed to take into account the effect of its product range choice 
on both its own and all other firms’ pricing decisions in the second stage of the game and 
the above first order condition will be equal to (see Appendix A.1):   
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is the elasticity of variable profits (i.e. the total margin over variable costs) for a typical 
firm i with respect to the size of its product range m . In the spirit of Shaked and Sutton 
(1990),  provides a measure of the expansion effect. Note that  is bounded to lie within 
the open interval (0,1) for  and s <1,
i
i i
i
12 which implies the existence of decreasing 
returns to the introduction of a new variety by a firm such that the optimal product range 
 will be finite. The term in the first set of square brackets corresponds to the open-loop 
solution, where the firm does not take into account the effects of a change in its mass of 
varieties on the other firms’ pricing decisions. This term is less than unity, reflecting the 
cannibalisation effect whereby the introduction of a new variety will depress the sales of 
the firm’s existing varieties and thereby lead to a less than proportionate increase in 
variable profits. The term in the second set of square brackets captures the strategic effect 
on the pricing decisions of the other firms. This term is also less than one, implying that the 
firm in the first stage will choose to under-expand its product range in order to limit price 
competition in the second stage. 
im
In the next section we shall derive the long-run symmetric equilibrium that occurs 
when all firms have the same product range size (i.e. mi = m  i [0,n]). Before doing so, it 
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is useful to consider the implications of such symmetry for the pricing and product range 
choice decisions of the firm.  
Starting with the second stage of the game, when all firms have the same product 
range, they will all choose the same price for all their varieties (i.e. phk = pil  h,i  [0,n],  
k,l  [0,m]). In this case for all firms s  is equal to 1/n and L . The latter varies 
inversely with both the mass of firms, tending to 1/ as the mass of firms n tends to 
infinity, and with the degree of substitutability between the products of competing firms, 
tending to zero as  and the products in different nests become perfect substitutes. In 
the short-run when n is fixed, the optimal price rule does not depend on the degree of 
substitutability between the varieties produced by the firm nor on the size of the firm’s 
product range. This result rests on the assumption that the firm co-ordinates its own pricing 
decisions in order to maximise overall profits as a monopolist in the supply of its own 
product range, which implies in (10) that the negative own-price demand effect and the 
positive intra-firm competition effect of a change in the price of an individual variety 
exactly cancel out. The same result is obtained by Anderson et al. (1992) but they 
conjecture that it stems from the lack of an outside alternative in their nested multinomial 
logit demand model. 
i Li 
Noting that symmetry between firms also implies  , in the first 
stage of the game, the first-order condition in (13) yields: 
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which is positive for n>113. Hence, in the symmetric short-run equilibrium, where the mass 
of firms is given, the typical firm’s product range is inversely related to the fixed cost 
associated with the launching of a new variety. An increase in the intra-firm elasticity of 
substitution between varieties  will have a negative effect on m by reducing the product 
range elasticity of variable profits . Conversely, an increase in the inter-firm elasticity of 
substitution  will increase the size of the product range as the positive effect of the 
resultant increase in  more than offsets the negative effect of a fall in L, the degree of 
market power enjoyed by the firm.  Finally, m tends to zero when n tends to infinity, that is 
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each firm wants to sell a single product (formally, a zero measure set of varieties) when the 
population of firms is arbitrarily large. 
 
3.2. Free-entry equilibrium  
The zero-profit equilibrium, which determines the endogenous mass of firms, can be 
thought of as the industry long-run. We solve for this equilibrium in the symmetric case 
where mi = m,  i [0,n] and therefore phk = pil  h,i [0,n],  k,l [0,m]. In this case, 
substituting equation (15) back into the profit function in (12) and setting the latter equal to 
zero yields the implicit solution for the free-entry equilibrium mass of firms as: 
(16) 01)1()( 





 

 L
n
n  
where =y/	. As noted earlier, n>1 must hold for each firm’s market share to be less than 
unity. Given that 1/ ≤ L<1 and 0< ≤ (–1)/(–1)<1, then it is apparent from (16) that 
n>1 requires ceteris paribus that the size of the market relative to firm level fixed cost, i.e. 
=y/	is sufficiently large. Substitution for L and  yields  
(17) 



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
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)( 2
23


nnn
DCnBnAnn  
where A, B, C and D are defined in the appendix. Given that the denominator of the ratio in 
brackets is positive for n
1, then (n)=0 requires the polynomial in the numerator to be 
zero. As discussed in Appendix A.2, this polynomial has only one real root for all relevant 
values of parameters and this root corresponds to a stable equilibrium.  
The main comparative static properties of the symmetric long-run equilibrium are 
summarised in Table 1 below.  A ceteris paribus increase in the size of the market for the 
differentiated good (y) leads to an increase in the long-run equilibrium mass of firms.  This 
in turn directly reduces firms’ market power L leading to a fall in the price of each variety.  
The increase in the mass of firms also increases the firms’ product range elasticity of 
variable profits .  Coupled with the increase in market size, this results in an expansion of 
product ranges in spite of the higher price competition.  Firm-level and industry price 
indexes both fall, with the effects of the reduction in individual variety prices reinforced by 
the increase in choice due to the expansion of product ranges and the mass of firms.  
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 Table 1:  Long-run equilibrium comparative statics 
Resultant changes in:   
Changes in:  
n L  m v=mn ikp  ip  p 
y +  –  + + + – – – 
	 – + – +(a) – + – (b) + 
 0 0 0 – – 0 + + 
 – – +(c) +(c) +(d) – – – 
 + – – – – – + + 
Sufficient conditions for the annotated signs to hold are: (a) n>L+2, (b) n>L+2, (c) n>2, 
(d) .    1/3)1(nn
 
The fixed cost per firm 	 determines the potential for the exploitation of scope 
economies and directly affects the mass of firms surviving in the free-entry equilibrium.  
Hence, a ceteris paribus increase in 	 will reduce the mass of firms in the industry, 
increasing the market power of the remaining firms but reducing the product range 
elasticity of variable profits.  In response, firms will raise the prices of individual varieties 
and, for n>L+2, expand product ranges to counter the fall in the number of competitors.  
For sufficiently large n, product range expansion may lead to a fall in the firm-level price 
index in spite of the increase in individual variety prices.  But, at the industry level, the 
effects of the fall in the mass of firms dominate, leading to an unambiguous fall in the total 
number of varieties on offer in the market and an increase of the industry price index.  
Given that the total cost function (7) is additive in the fixed cost terms, changes in 
the fixed cost per variety  do not affect the equilibrium mass of firms n. As a result, both 
the degree of market power and the product range elasticity of variable profits are 
independent of  and changes in the fixed cost per variety will not affect the price of 
individual varieties. Clearly though, the size of the product range is inversely related to  in 
(15) so firms respond to increases in fixed costs per variety by cutting back on the number 
of varieties that each of them offers. This contraction of product ranges leads to increases 
in both the firm-level and industry-level price indexes. 
The inter-firm elasticity of substitution  determines the distinctiveness of firms’ 
product ranges. An increase in  implies that product ranges become more homogeneous 
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and therefore results in an immediate decline in firms’ market power L and a fall in the 
prices of individual varieties. This reduction in price-cost margins leads to exit from the 
industry and to a long-run decline in the mass of firms. For n>2, an increase in  will also 
give rise to an increase in the product range elasticity of variable profits .  Coupled with 
the fall in the mass of firms, this results in a long-run expansion in product ranges in spite 
of the reduced price-cost margins.  Firm-level and industry price indexes both fall, with the 
effects of the reduction in individual variety prices reinforced, for sufficiently large n,  by 
the increase in choice both within product ranges and in the market as a whole. 
The intra-firm elasticity of substitution  determines the distinctiveness of 
individual varieties within each firm’s product range.  An increase in  implies that the 
varieties offered by any single firm become more homogeneous and will therefore result in 
an immediate decline in the product range elasticity of variable profits  and a contraction 
of product ranges.  This contraction of existing firms’ product ranges induces entry leading 
to a long-run rise in the mass of firms with negative consequences for firms’ market power 
and the prices charged for individual varieties. Nevertheless, the reduction of choice, both 
within product ranges and in the market as a whole, leads to increases in the firm-level and 
industry price indexes. 
In summary, depending on the value of its structural parameters, the model may 
give rise both to fragmented equilibria with a large population of firms each offering a 
small range of products, and to concentrated equilibria with a small mass of firms each 
offering many products. Specifically, the free-entry equilibrium will be more likely to 
consist of a large (small) population of firms with small (large) product ranges when (i) 
fixed costs per firm are small (large) relative both to the size of the market and to fixed 
costs per variety, (ii) the inter-firm elasticity of substitution is low (high), and (iii) the intra-
firm elasticity of substitution is high (low). There will exist values of y, 	, , and  such 
that each firm in the free-entry equilibrium will choose a single variant.  
 
3.4. Social optimum  
To compare the free-entry equilibrium with the social optimum subject to a zero profit 
constraint, first note that the second-best welfare optimum corresponds to the market 
equilibrium outcome in the “large number” monopolistic competition case14 , and can 
therefore be found by setting L and  equal to their respective limiting values of 1/ and 
(-1)/(-1). Hence, given that L > 1/ and <(-1)/(-1) for finite n, it is easy to show that 
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prices will be too high in equilibrium with too many firms offering too few varieties, both 
individually and in total. These findings are also obtained for the nested multinomial logit 
demand model by Anderson and de Palma (1992) (see also Anderson et al., 1992, p.257) 
who argue that it arises as the net outcome of three distinct effects: a business stealing 
externality (an entrant does not internalise the detrimental effects on existing firms’ profits) 
which is a tendency for excessive entry, a consumer surplus externality (an entrant can not 
extract the whole consumer surplus associated with producing its product line) which is a 
tendency to under-entry, and a multiproduct externality (an entrant does not account for the 
contraction of the product ranges of existing firms) which is again a tendency for over-
entry. As in Anderson and de Palma (1992), we find that the net effect is too much inter-
firm diversity but too little intra-firm diversity and, as a result, too little total diversity. 
 
 
4. AN EXPLORATIVE APPLICATION TO INDUSTRY SHAKEOUT 
In this section we highlight some of the implications of the model developed above for the 
evolution of market structure during the life cycle of an industry. It is a commonly accepted 
stylised fact of industry evolution that the number of producers in many new industries first 
increases to a peak and then, despite continuing growth in the size of the market, falls sharply 
until it finally reaches a stable level (see Sutton, 1997, for references). Here, we want to 
explore the proposition that industry shakeout may result in some industries from a change in 
the scope as well as the scale of firms over the course of the product life cycle.  
The majority of models proposed in the literature to account for the shakeout in the 
number of firms during the product life cycle of an industry rest on the basic proposition that 
shakeout is the outcome of changes in the scale of production15.  Changes in the scope of firm 
output have not been central to the analysis of shakeout despite empirical evidence that 
product proliferation may be associated with the shakeout phase. For example, Raff and 
Trajtenberg (1997) document how the early development of the United States automobile 
industry was characterised by a rise in the number of models (varieties) on offer, more 
through entry than through model proliferation, but that after 1910 the number of firms in the 
industry fell (from an average of 153 between 1910 and 1920 to an average of 30 in the 
1930’s) while the number of models offered by the surviving firms rose substantially (from an 
average of 5.1 body models per firm in the 1910’s to 18.4 in the 1930’s).  Brander and Eaton 
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(1984) observe that a fairly common historical pattern is for firms to expand the scope of their 
product offerings and compete more directly with each other as the market grows.   
In our opinion therefore, a full analysis of the evolution of market structure over the 
product life cycle should allow for the possible role played by the strategic product range 
choices made by individual firms16. Given the exploratory nature of our analysis, we shall not 
develop a dynamic model of industry evolution. Instead, we shall employ the partial 
equilibrium model developed above to assess whether changes in the scope of production are 
likely to be a contributory factor in the shakeout of firms. By means of comparative static 
analysis, we shall consider whether stylised changes in both process technology and product 
characteristics observed over the course of the product life cycle may serve in some industries 
to induce a shift from a fragmented equilibrium, in the early stages of the industry 
development, to a  concentrated equilibrium in the mature industry. 
 
4.1. Process technology: changes in scale and changes in scope 
Industry shakeout is generally presumed to be the direct outcome of changes in the scale of 
firms’ output which lead to a reduction in the number of firms that can survive in the 
industry, despite continuing growth in the market. In the product life cycle model (see 
Utterback and Suarez, 1993), firms invest in new capital-intensive technologies that yield 
lower unit costs of production but at higher volumes of output.  Alternatively, Klepper 
(1996) assumes that firms must invest in research and development in order to maintain 
competitive levels of unit costs.  Expenditure on advertising and other selling activities 
might also play a similar role in some industries given the existence of promotional scale 
economies (see Sutton, 1991). 
In the typical shakeout model, firms produce a single product such that fixed 
investments give rise to simple scale economies in production.  The fact that most firms are 
multiproduct, however, implies that they may seek to exploit economies of both scope and 
scale, where the former can arise from the cost advantages of making a number of products 
in the same production unit, of distributing a number of products though the same channels, 
and of managing a number of products within the same organisation.  For example, 
Chandler (1990) cites the case of the German chemical dye industry as a prime example in 
which leading companies sought to exploit fully economies of scope by building plants that 
produced ‘literally hundreds of dyes’ (p.25).   
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In our model, the balance between scope and scale is determined by 	 and , the 
firm-level and variety-level fixed costs respectively.  Increases in either type of fixed cost 
will lead to a shakeout in the total number of varieties on offer in the market, but only 
increases in the firm-level fixed cost 	 lead to exit from the industry.  This suggests that the 
shakeout process may be more pronounced in industries where increases in firms’ overhead 
costs dominate increases in variety-level costs. Moreover, the long run-equilibrium in these 
cases will be characterised by a smaller number of firms each producing a wider product 
range.  
Thus, our analysis identifies the nature of the changes in the cost structures of firms 
that may tend to shift the industry from a fragmented equilibrium to a concentrated 
equilibrium over the course of the product life cycle.  
 
4.2. Product characteristics: changes in heterogeneity 
Changes in product characteristics are a central feature of most descriptions of the product 
life cycle: indeed, products without rich opportunities for both product and process 
innovations may not follow the prototypical product life cycle (see Klepper, 1996).  Most 
accounts of the shakeout process note a reduction in the degree of heterogeneity in the 
products offered by different firms over time. In the product life cycle model, this is 
generally ascribed to the emergence of a ‘dominant design’ that, by creating the conditions 
for the investment in capital-intensive technologies, triggers the shakeout process. 
Conversely, in Klepper (1996) the diversity of competing versions of the product declines 
as a consequence rather than as a cause of the shakeout process.  
We would add that, within a multiproduct firm framework, standardisation of the 
product offerings of different firms may also be accompanied by changes in the 
heterogeneity of the products offered by each individual firm.  In the early stages of the 
product life cycle in which rival firms commonly offer products based on radically 
different technologies, variants offered by the same firm are likely to be relatively 
homogeneous compared to those offered by their rivals.  The subsequent emergence of a 
dominant design may then lead to the complete ‘commoditisation’ of the product with 
firms competing on price alone.  But the more likely scenario is for a number of distinct 
variants of the generic design of the product to continue to be offered on the market to cater 
for what may be increasingly discerning consumer tastes, with the locus of differentiation 
shifting from fundamental or primary characteristics to adaptive or secondary 
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characteristics of the production technology (Saviotti, 1996).  Given an established group 
of competing firms in the market, each firm has an incentive to develop products that are 
closer substitutes to each other than to those of other firms, since joint production of these 
products will lead to less intense price and output competition (Brander and Eaton, 1984)17.  
However, the scope for secondary differentiation is likely to be limited by the number of 
characteristics over which the varieties of the product may be differentiated from each 
other, and by crowding of the firm’s characteristic space if the product range is extended 
for any reason. 
The individual varieties offered by a single firm might therefore be expected to 
become somewhat more distinct as the product ranges of competing firms become 
increasingly uniform.  In our model, a reduction in the degree of heterogeneity of the 
products offered by different firms may be characterised as an increase in , the inter-firm 
elasticity of substitution. Conversely, any increase in the heterogeneity of the varieties 
offered by a single firm are captured by reduction in , the intra-firm elasticity of 
substitution. Thus the increasing standardisation of products offered by different firms and 
the increasing differentiation of varieties offered by individual firms over the product life 
cycle both serve to reinforce the shakeout of firms and the expansion of product ranges.  
In conclusion, taking into account the main stylised facts about industry shakeout, 
our theoretical analysis of the product life cycle suggests the possibility that changes in 
product heterogeneity may complement and reinforce those arising from the exploitation of 
economies of scope and scale in shifting the industry from a fragmented equilibrium to a 
concentrated equilibrium characterised by a smaller number of firms each producing a 
larger number of varieties. Clearly, empirical research will be required in order to elucidate 
the relative importance of changes in process technology and product characteristics in the 
shakeout of individual industries. We would suggest that it may be of particular interest to 
examine the evolution of advertising-intensive industries, such as those producing 
packaged, branded goods, in which fundamental product and process innovation is limited 
but heavy advertising expenditures tend both to increase fixed costs on the supply side and 
to influence the relative size of the competition and expansion effects on the demand side. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have extended the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model of imperfect competition 
(Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) to allow for multiproduct firms. We endogenously determine both 
the number of varieties per firm and the number of firms in the industry.  A crucial feature 
of the model is that firms internalise the effects of both intra- and inter-firm competition in 
making their pricing  and product range decisions. Thus firms behave as oligopolists not as 
monopolistic competitors and each firm co-ordinates its pricing decisions across all the 
varieties that it produces so as to maximise overall profits. 
Depending on the values of the structural parameters, the model may give rise to 
both fragmented equilibria in which a large number of firms offer either one or a small 
range of products, and concentrated equilibria in which either one or a small number of 
firms each offer many products. We identify a competition effect and an expansion effect as 
determinants of the market equilibria. This characterisation serves to clarify the way in 
which the nature of consumer preference influences market structure and may also facilitate 
model estimation from standard industrial cost data and market intelligence reports.  
The model is used to explore the proposition that shakeout may result in some cases 
from a change in the scope as well as the scale of firms over the course of the product life 
cycle. We do not seek to endogenise fixed costs due to (sunk) investments in either new 
process technologies (Jovanovic and Macdonald, 1994), process R&D (Klepper, 1996) or 
advertising (Sutton, 1991). Nor do we consider vertical product differentiation either as a 
transient phenomenon due to the diffusion of product improvements or as a permanent 
feature of the market. Moreover, we abstract from possible asymmetries either in costs 
(Jovanovic and Macdonald, 1994; Klepper, 1996; Montagna, 1995) or in strategic behaviour 
(Sutton, 1991) between firms. Nevertheless, our comparative static analysis does serve to 
demonstrate that the forces leading to the emergence of multiproduct firms may 
complement the standard explanation of industry shakeout. In so doing, we hope to have 
shown that by using a nested-CES oligopolistic model of multiproduct competition it is 
possible to offer a richer characterisation of the shakeout process. 
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Appendix 
A.1 Derivation  of the closed-loop solution  
The profit function of the typical firm is  
(12)          iiii msyL
Partially differentiating (12) with respect to the firm’s product range mi we obtain: 
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A.2  Free-entry equilibrium 
In the symmetric equilibrium the profit function is 
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where:   
 12  A ;   
    )1()1(2 2B ;  
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 
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To determine the zero-profit free-entry equilibrium we need to solve (n)=0 for n. The 
profit function in (A.2) is a ratio of polynomials in n: the denominator is positive for all 
n≥1. Hence, for (n)=0 the numerator must be zero, i.e.  
(A.3)   0)( 23  DCnBnAnnf
Note that A<0. Hence:  n     (n)-  and  n -     (n) +. Furthermore it is 
tedious but straightforward to show that (n) has only one real root for all plausible values 
of parameters.  Hence, f(n) is of the form1:   
 
 
(n) 
n 
 
where the real root clearly corresponds to a stable equilibrium, since f(n) cuts the horizontal 
axis from above at n>1: other things equal, firms’ profit falls if n increases and vice-versa.   
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1 This particular graph is obtained for: =6, =3, =10. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 Baldwin and Ottaviano (1998) have also employed the representative consumer framework to model FDI and 
trade patterns, but only between two established multiproduct multinationals. 
2 This is one of the three major approaches used in the literature to model the demand for differentiated 
products, the others being the address and the discrete choice (random utility) approaches. Anderson et al. 
(1992) show that there exists a class of discrete choice models that are consistent with both the representative 
consumer and the address approaches. Hence, the representative consumer and the address models of product 
differentiation can be linked “via the intermediary of the discrete choice approach” (Anderson et al., 1992, 
page 7). 
3  Given homothetic preferences and linear budget constraints, this is equivalent to a one-shot utility 
maximisation (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1990). 
4 Verboven (1996) generalises the nested logit model developed by Anderson and de Palma (1992) and 
Anderson et al. (1992), and shows that the demand functions derived from the nested version of the 
representative consumer CES model are equivalent to those generated from a version of the nested logit 
discrete choice model. This equivalence explains why the general character of the results obtained in this 
paper is similar to those obtained by Anderson and de Palma (1992). 
5 Anderson and de Palma (2000) introduce a framework that incorporates both localised and global 
competition and that has different oligopolistic models of product differentiation (the circle, the logit and the 
CES) as limit cases. 
6 For expositional convenience we may sometimes refer to ‘number’ rather than ‘mass’. 
7  One may also conceive of complex market structures involving both interlacing and segmentation. In 
general, the type of market structure may be the endogenous outcome of the competitive process. 
8 The market interlacing case raises the substantive issue of the determination of the number of nests. One 
cannot simply assume an unlimited number of potential nests in which the firm might choose to operate with 
identical costs, because this provides no incentive for a firm to enter a nest occupied by another firm. 
9 As Katz (1984) observes, the pattern of advertising gives an indication of the importance of brand-wide 
effects, with firms in many industries using advertising to promote entire product lines rather than any single 
variant.  
 
10 Equation (9) can be re-written using (6) and (8) as: 
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from which the symmetry of the firm’s prices is clear. 
11 It is tedious but straightforward to show that the Hessian is negative definite for integer values of m1.   
12 In the limit, the expansion effect will tend to zero as  and the products offered by the firm become 
perfect substitutes for each other, and to as 0. 
13 It is straightforward to show that the second order condition is unambiguously negative if n>1.  
14 This result can readily be shown. See also Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
15  See Utterback and Abernathy (1975), Abernathy and Utterback (1978), Utterback and Suarez (1993), 
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) and Klepper (1996).  
16 Product proliferation is recognised in the literature (e.g. Schmalansee, 1978) as a possible form of strategic 
entry deterrence in mature differentiated-goods oligopolies. But what is not clear from this literature is the 
extent to which changes in the scope of firms might also be instrumental in the process leading to the mature 
industry stage (though see Sutton, 1991, on the specific case of the ready-to-eat breakfast cereals industry). 
17 Alternatively, firms may choose to develop products that more closely resemble those of their competitors, 
transforming an initially segmented market structure into an interlaced one through the fragmentation of the 
market into a number of separate sub-markets or nests within each of which all firms compete (this possibility 
cannot be formally explored in this paper). 
